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Abstract
As a kind of typical public law discrimination, institutional discrimination brings 
violation to the citizens’ equal rights. Therefore, discrimination body’s legal liability 
shall be pursued. All in all, the legal responsibility of institutional discrimination 
is a public law responsibility which is made up of the public power as main 
infringement subject, formal and informal regulations as infringement action, and 
the coexist of fault and innocence as subjective status.
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INTRODUTION
Institutional discrimination is because that the formal acknowledgement of the 
state or the execution of public power causes certain amount of social groups 
continuously suffering common and standard unreasonable treatment. As a kind of 
typical public law discrimination, institutional discrimination brings violation to 
certain social groups’ equal rights. Since public power subject diverged from the 
distribution of justice in the process of designing the institution, then we should 
investigate its legal responsibility to amend the already violated civil rights.
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1.  PUBLIC POWER SUBJECT
From the concept of institutional discrimination it is not difficult for us to get the 
point that the infringement subject of institutional discrimination is public power 
subject. The research focus of modern public law gradually turns to the performance 
of public functions. That is to say, 
on one hand, public law positively deals with public functional departments’ functions, 
structures, organizations, and procedures; on the other hand, by setting up and perform 
public functional departments’ responsibilities to negatively mange, control, and supervise 
the performance of public functions. (Cane, 2008) 
It has broadened the research field of public law in a large degree. However, at the 
same time, the expansion of public law research has made the public power subject’s 
scope a bit vague. After all, whether a function is public or not is a normative not 
a factual question. When vague public power subject meets indistinct institutional 
discrimination, the problem seems to get more complicated.
This paper thinks that within the research framework of institutional 
discrimination, we can at least divide institutional discrimination infringement 
subject into legislative organs, administrative organs, judicial organs, and other 
public power subjects. As provided by the Constitution, legislative organs, 
administrative organs, and judicial organs are most formal legal institutions’ 
designers and promoters. In the process of the design and promotion of legal 
institutions, even judicial organs which are thought as the guardians of the 
Constitution have the possibility to violate citizens’ equal rights or get involved 
in institutional discrimination, not to say that legislative organs can vacillate 
among different discriminations based on different parties’ or regions’ disputes on 
interests or administrative organs diverge away from the goal of public interest to 
realize officials’ or interest groups’ self-interests by violating citizens’ equal rights. 
Such phenomenon is especially obvious in China. Since the Supreme People’s 
Court has judicial interpretation power, thus, judicial organs do have institutional 
discrimination upon citizens in certain circumstances in practice. For example, 
according to the stipulation of “The Supreme Court’s Judicial Interpretation and 
Law-Application for Personal Injury Cases”: “Compensation for death shall be 20 
times of the per capita disposable annual income or rural per capita net income of 
the court of claim”, such judicial interpretation has caused the institutional tragedy 
that urban and rural residents’ lives are of “different prices”. (Ren, 2007) As to the 
other public power subjects, this article makes reference to Prof. LI, Haiping’s idea 
to call them as non-state public power or social public power. According to the 
understanding of Prof. Li, non-state public power is “enjoyed by the organizations 
that do not stipulate in the Constitution as state organs.” (Li, 2012, November 
24) The scope of non-state power at least contains political parties, People’s 
organizations, and social organizations. The common place of these organizations 
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is that they all have public affair management power in certain forms or in different 
degrees and therefore can make discriminatory institutional arrangement on their 
members or other citizens in certain scope.
In fact, non-state public power does not only exist in China, it can be found in 
many countries and regions around the world. And the institutional discriminations 
made by non-state public power subjects are not rare of ordinary occurrence. For 
example, in the “Smith vs. Alwright, 321 US. 650” case in 1944 USA, democratic 
Convention of the State of Texas passed a resolution that colored races are banned 
from being democrats or attending elections of the Congressmen, state governors, 
or other officials (Zhang, 2004). Apparently, such resolution of Texas Democratic 
Party is a kind of institutional discrimination on the election rights of colored races 
within the scope of Texas, therefore, it was finally aborted by the Federal Supreme 
Court. As we can see that even in countries like the USA which have well developed 
political and legal systems, institutional discrimination is inevitable. It is not very 
difficult for us to imagine that 
in countries with less developed political and legal systems, policies made by political 
parties can become documents with legal force in practice to bind governmental 
organizations. Under this circumstance, the state organs carrying out such policies made 
by the political parties, it is possible for them to violate citizens’ basic rights. (Yao, 2006)
2.  THE FORMAL AND INFORMAL SYSTEMS
Since institutional discrimination is carried out by public power subjects through 
institutional design, then the design and implementation of the systems are 
apparently the infringement act of institutional discrimination. According to 
different ways of the setups of the systems, there are formal and informal systems. 
The former one is “a series of regulations or rules created by organization members, 
especially the leading groups, on purpose on the basis of social life experience.” 
(Si, 2011) The latter on refers to “a series of restrictions recognized by the society 
and gradually formed during people’s long term social interactions.” (Wang, 2005). 
Although informal system is mainly shown as traditional concepts, moral standards, 
village regulations and agreements, customs, and ideologies and so on, and is 
“basically implemented under the non-mandatory force or ‘soft constraining’ such 
as public opinion and self-restriction of social members” (Xin, 2005), this does 
not rule out the important role played by state power on the formation of informal 
systems. Xiebosier and Weigast explicitly pointed out in a research about the 
institutional foundation of committees’ power that 
those congressional committees powers which cannot be explained by formal regulations, 
are formed from a set of informal and unwritten restrictions and those restrictions evolved 
under the background of participants’ repeated interactions (exchanges). Even these 
restrictions never was included as formal regulations, they are gradually accepted as 
systematic restrictions. (Douglass, 2008) 
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Or, to be precise, when informal institutional factors initiated from social life are 
accepted and recognized by state organs and promoted by state power, the informal 
system in the public law area can exist. For example, the informal system of civil 
servants enrollment refers to “a series of factors such as the value and belief of the 
official examination formed on a long-term basis, ethical norms, ethical principles, 
and ideologies.” (Wang & Gong, 2008) This system mainly forms during historical 
accumulation and social convention and thus accepted and recognized by state 
power. In practice, no matter formal or informal institutional discriminations, is 
very typical. As for the former one, for example, Article 8 of the Marriage Law in 
People’s Republic of China states: 
Both the man and the woman desiring to contract a marriage shall register in person with the 
marriage registration office. If the proposed marriage is found to conform with the provisions 
of this Law, the couple shall be allowed to register and issued marriage certificates. The 
husband-and-wife relationship shall be established as soon as they obtain the marriage 
certificates. A couple shall go through marriage registration if it has not done so.
This Article has limited marriage between only two different sexes and thus 
excludes the establishment of marriage of the same sex which apparently has become 
a formal institutional discrimination for the equal rights of marriage to the same-sex. 
And for the latter one, for example, the discrimination upon woman in China’s public 
servant examination is a typical informal institutional discrimination. Although the 
Constitution, the Labor Law, the Employment Promotion Act, and the Civil Servant 
Law and other laws clearly state that female and male enjoy equal employment rights, 
in the practice of recruiting civil servants, the discrimination against women has 
become very common no matter in the central government or in local governments. It 
is definitely institutional discrimination in informal system arrangements.1
3.  FAULT AND NON-FAULT COEXIST
For the subjective state of liability, tort liability law has changed from pure 
subjective fault to the coexistence of fault and non-fault. Ricoeur has pointed out: 
Contemporary history which is called as Liability Law prefers to give non-fault liability 
application scope under the pressure of related, safety, risk and such concepts from the technical 
layer of this term. However, non-fault liability has the tendency of replacing faulty concept, just 
as the anti-punishment of civil liability has to contain complete anti-self-accusation. (Ricoeur, 
2007, p.28) 
1For example, according to the “2011 Report of Employment discrimination in the National civil 
servant recruitment” released by the Institute of Constitutional Government of China University 
of Political Science and Law, compared with the result of 2010, the gender discrimination has 
increased in 2011. Positions with gender discrimination have increased from 1203 of 2010 to 
1,519 of 2,011 and the proportion of all positions increased from 2010’s 12.96% to 2011’s 15.6%. 
For example, the announcement of Fujian Province’s civil servant recruitment 2012 shows that 
the number of positions only opens to male is 940 while the ones only open to female is 101, 
number of positions without limitations on gender is 1,833. That is to say, male can apply for 
more than 2,700 positions while female can only apply for 1,900 positions. 
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Although Ricoeur’s analysis strengthened the importance of non-fault liability 
in modern liability law, he obviously overstated the wide application of non-fault 
principle. The reason that non-fault principle comes into being is nothing but 
because
people want to see that when there is a lack of fault actions the compensation can be also 
made sure. Thus, the objective evaluation of damages has the trend of eliminating the 
subjective connection between actions and the doer. Just from this, the concept of non-
fault liability forms. (Ricoeur, 2007, p.29)
However, the coexistence of fault and non-fault liability indeed enriches the content 
of liability law and better protects citizens’ legal rights. The change of subjective 
constitutive elements of liability in Tort Liability Law also deeply affects the anti-
discrimination law. Professor Li, Weiwei concludes: 
The expansion of the scope of anti-discrimination law from direct discrimination to 
indirect discrimination can be considered as derived from the development of fault theory 
of tort law. This development has close relation with the people’s interests that anti-
discrimination law protects. (Li, 2012) 
Professor Li, Weiwei thinks as intentional discrimination, direct discrimination 
obviously should have fault on its constitutive elements; while as neutral 
discrimination, indirect discrimination is not formed by having subjective 
intentions, instead, it is defined by the harmful consequences of the act, therefore, it 
should focus on the non-fault concept in subjective elements. This paper thinks that 
the conclusion of Professor Li, Weiwei also applies on institutional discrimination. 
In the institutional discrimination, indirect discrimination and direct discrimination 
also exist. For example, the “On further strengthening the recognition of urban 
residents entitled to basic living allowances” issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
in 2010, when affirming the low income people, there is provisions on the type and 
condition of family property and family income. It is thought that family property 
refers to “securities, deposit, real estate, vehicles and other properties owned by 
family members who live together.” And family income is “the disposable income 
including income from wage and salary after tax and social security payment, 
business net income, income from property, and transferred income owned by all 
family members living together within a specified time limit.” From the literal 
aspect we can see that these provisions do not contain discrimination, however, if 
we refer to Article 3 of Marriage Law, it is not difficult to find out that the family 
relations recognized by Chinese laws only include spousal relationship, parent-child 
relationship, grandparent and grandchild relationship, sisterhood or brotherhood 
relationship, and other relationship based on heterosexual marriage. Homosexual 
marriage based relationships cannot be counted as family relations. We cannot 
say that the provisions of the Ministry of Civil Affairs intentionally discriminate 
homosexual persons, but the fact of the provisions indeed show that homosexual 
persons are excluded which is obviously an indirect discrimination. However, 
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Article 3 of the Marriage Law is worth considering. As an expression of sexual 
freedom, homosexuality cannot be accused. However, due to the discrimination of 
religious culture, traditional morality, and the concept of child-bearing, homosexual 
persons are widely discriminated in social life. Legislators have accepted such 
social concepts and thus institutionalize and legalize such concepts by legislation. 
Therefore, the definition of family relations in Article 3 of Marriage Law is 
definitely direct discrimination for homosexual persons. 
There is another subjective state of institutional discrimination worth study. 
There is legitimate institutional discrimination in history, or to say, the institutional 
discrimination in good faith. Then how should we define the subjective state of 
such institutional discrimination? This paper thinks that the historical legitimacy of 
institutional discrimination or the good will of the purpose of such design is relative. 
When the foundation of such legitimacy or good will does not exist or changes, if 
the public power refuses to amend, then the subjective state should be faulted. For 
example, the discrimination against women is not a real discrimination in history for 
a very long period and even be recognized as a kind of protection for women. With 
this concept in heart, the institution design of women’s discrimination usually shows 
man’s care and concern for them. “Men probably treat women as parents. … in 
another way, the care women’s life got is more than men.” (Brest, Levinson, Balkin, 
& Amar, 2002) The care-based institution design even affects women themselves. 
“Most women resign to fate and do not want to make any actions; … when they 
entered into the world, they take men’s opinions to bring into correspondence with 
men.” (Simone, 2011) Under such background, the discriminative arrangement 
in the system against women does not appear so dazzling but with some kind of 
reasonability. Such reasonability even lasts until recent era. 
The modern citizen Constitution also includes the modern constitutionalism. There is no 
clear prohibition on the discrimination on gender. It’s a reflection of the discrimination 
raised by real sex in politics and society. Therefore, in modern times, women are 
discriminated by many areas. (Sugihara, 2000)
However, the historical legitimacy does not mean the institutional discrimination 
against women is legal at present. On the contrary, if there is still discriminative 
arrangement against women in institutional design, then the public power must have 
fault in subjective state.
CONCLUSION
As discussed above, the legal liability of institutional discrimination is an 
independent legal responsibility made up by subject of liability, way of acting, 
and subjective state. The reason that we study the constitution of institutional 
discrimination’s legal liability, on one hand, is to further discuss and investigate 
the content of the legal liability of institutional discrimination; on the other hand, 
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the most significant meaning is to get rid of the limitation of formal legitimacy of 
analytical-positivist jurisprudence and to ascertain the legal liability of public power 
subjects’ institutional discriminations through the study of the constitution of legal 
liability of institutional discrimination. This is the premise of regulating institutional 
discrimination.
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